Later Marxist morality – Its relevance for Africa=s post-colonial situation by Coetzee, P.
 Koers 66(4) 2001:621-637 621 
Later Marxist morality – Its relevance for 
Africa=s post-colonial situation 
Pieter Coetzee 
Department of Philosophy 
University of South Africa 
PRETORIA 
E-mail: coetzph@unisa.ac.za 
Abstract 
Later Marxist morality – Its relevance for Africa=s post-colonial situation 
Marx’s polemic against exploitation focuses centrally on the idea that 
capitalism not only betrays the inviolability of the human individual, but also 
prevents the realization of man’s true nature as “species-being” and the 
realization of the kind of community appropriate to this nature, thus 
preventing the freeing of human potential from the structural force of 
capital. I examine this polemic with reference to the views of African 
philosophers (Hountondji and others) on Africa’s exposure to neo-colonial 
exploitation, extracting from it a view of morality as a plea for a “humanly 
human life”. I advance some considerations for acceptance of this plea as 
a basis for dealing with European domination.   
1. Understanding exploitation 
The concept of exploitation is central to later Marxist accounts of how 
neo-colonialism maintains the gap between oppressors and oppressed in 
Africa. A true description of the face of contemporary Africa, says 
Hountondji (1996:170), must include mentioning “the bare hands of men 
and women so exploited and mystified that they make themselves active 
accomplices of their executioners”. And since the concept of exploitation 
is central to their condemnation of neo-colonialism, I propose to examine 
it with a view to understanding its moral implications. 
1.1 The structural force thesis 
Holmstrom (1997) offers a good starting point. Holmstrom (1997:22), 
accepting the labour theory of value as a given, argues that the worker 
sells her capacity of labour power to the capitalist. Labour power 
generates  two kinds of  value,  the value of  labour  power for the worker 
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and surplus value for the capitalist. The former is produced in satisfying 
the subsistence needs of the worker and her dependents; the latter is 
produced in that portion of the workday after subsistence needs have 
been satisfied, and is the source of profit (exchange value). The worker 
is paid only for the labour value she produces; her time spent producing 
surplus value is unpaid, but this fact “is concealed by the wage relation-
ship” (Holmstrom, 1997:79). The relationship between worker and capi-
talist is hardly one of free exchange between equals; indeed “the 
exchange is an unfree one, because it is based on force” (Holmstrom, 
1997:79). 
Reiman’s (1997:154) “force-inclusive definition” of exploitation includes 
the idea of structural force. “A society is exploitive when its social 
structure is organized so that unpaid labour is systematically forced out 
of one class and put at the disposal of another” (Reiman, 1997:154). 
Force is structural, internal to the workings of the capitalist system, and 
not external support to a distribution which benefits one class at the 
expense of another. Reiman (1997:158) defends the notion of “labour 
time” – what workers give in production is their time and energy – as the 
appropriate measure of the value that produced things have as a result 
of being produced, a notion he calls the “general labour theory of value” 
(Reiman, 1997:158) and which he contrasts with the “special” theory 
(Reiman, 1997:158) which assumes that the market value of produced 
things is a function of the time spent on their production. The general 
theory, claims Reiman (1997:158), is the minimum necessary to make 
the concept of surplus value imply unpaid labour (if we grant the 
assumption that it does not presuppose the validity of any system of 
ownership). Unpaid time is given in production in the sense that it is 
“used up”, is “life itself spent” (Reiman, 1997:158). This category of 
unpaid labour is extracted by force that is “‘structural’, both in its effects 
and origins” (Reiman, 1997:160). The workers, nonowners of the means 
of production, are forced to work for the small class of owners (though 
not forced by them) “in order to get a crack at living at all” (Reiman, 
1997:160). The force at issue here is generated by the structure of the 
institution of private ownership, which is to say the crucial category of 
unpaid labour is forced from them by the class system itself, and this 
force affects individuals “by imposing an array of fates on ... [them]” 
(Reiman, 1997:160), in particular the inability to use the surplus of their 
labour to improve their condition. As a leverage over them to which they 
are vulnerable in virtue of their position in the structure, structural force 
determines “a range of things they can do, with options outside this 
range ... [being] prohibitively costly” (Reiman, 1997:162). Force, appa-
rently, works through “predictable free choices” (Reiman, 1997:164), and 
that is why the way force works in capitalism remains unseen. It is, 
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however, as a class that unpaid labour is forcibly extracted from the 
workers and transferred as surplus value to the capitalist class. 
The “force”-thesis divides into two claims. First, the synchronic claim is 
that the structure of capitalism – specifically the institution of private 
ownership – forces nonowners to sell their labour to owners of the means 
of production (Reiman, 1997:177). The synchronic claim places selling in 
a time-frame –  
… something like the time it takes from satiation to the onset of the 
pains of starvation (or some other pressing need), since that is the time 
by which, deprived of means of production (and of savings produced by 
them), ... [a worker] will be compelled to sell his labour power (Reiman, 
1997:177).  
The diachronic claim maintains that the structure of capitalism compels 
nonowners to remain members of their class and therefore, given that 
their position is unchangeable, they remain subject to structural force. 
Diachronic force, like synchronic force, however, is structural force. 
According to Reiman (1997:179-180) the synchronic claim is the im-
portant one. It is by itself sufficient to support the Marxist charge that 
capitalism is a form of slavery. Selling labour power involves giving away 
an uncompensated amount of it, and this is true irrespective of the period 
for which they are compelled to sell. (How severely they are enslaved is 
obviously influenced by the truth of the diachronic claim). By itself the 
synchronic claim is also sufficient to support the Marxist claim about how 
capitalism works economically. The diachronic claim is sociologically 
interesting, understood as a claim about how the working class 
reproduces itself. But it depends on the synchronic claim for its sense 
and coherence. The falsity of the synchronic claim would destroy Marxist 
analyses of the capitalist mode of production, and by implication, the 
truth of the diachronic claim. The moral significance of the diachronic 
claim also depends on the truth of the synchronic claim, but the syn-
chronic claim has moral significance in its own right independently of the 
diachronic claim. (More of this below.) 
1.2 Primary and secondary exploitation 
Dymski and Elliott (1997:203) support Reiman’s force-thesis but they 
note that in Marx the issue of exploitation is raised in two contexts, one in 
which capitalist mastery over a working class is effected through 
productive use of resources, which Marx calls “primary exploitation” 
(Dymski & Elliott, 1997:203), and another in which mastery is posited 
without productive use of resources, the latter being “secondary 
exploitation”, a “purely distributive phenomenon” (Dymski & Elliott, 1997: 
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203). They point out that Reiman errs in that his “force-inclusive” concept 
is too narrow. Primary exploitation involves “class monopoly over the 
physical means of production and a regime of alienated labour and 
domination both inside and outside the enterprise” (Dymski & Elliott, 
1997:203, my emphasis). Exploitation, in the sense Reiman does not 
sufficiently emphasize is human and social exploitation, involving 
alienation and domination in a wider, extra-economic context. The wider 
concept of exploitation (as I shall argue below) takes in Hountondji’s 
concept of “culturalism” as vehicle of exploitation on a scale Dymski and 
Elliott (1997:203) argue is in place “both inside and outside” the physical 
means of production.  
1.2.1  Primary exploitation 
Casal (1998:143) explains the global reproduction of class structures as 
a coincidence of neo-colonialism. The global structure of international 
relations, claims Casal, is organised in such a way that the interests of 
the colonial powers are protected at the expense of “productive progress” 
(Casal, 1998:143) in Africa and other Third World societies. Casal 
(1998:143) identifies two ways in which the exploitive practices of 
international capital work. The neo-colonial powers maintain their 
position, first of all, by transmitting to the exploited societies the infra-
structure (the functional prerequisite) required to enter a more advanced 
stage. But this transmission has “undesirable consequences” (Casal, 
1998:144) for the less developed societies. The higher technology 
imports supplant the lower technology on the home front, thus at once 
destroying home-grown technology (of an appropriate level of develop-
ment for the home society) and increasing the dominance of the alien 
powers in the sense that the supporting technologies convert home 
economies into supplier economies whose productive units are controlled 
by international capital (Casal, 1998:145). 
Alternatively, the neo-colonial powers transplant “an economic structure, 
which generates the previously absent tendency to productive progress 
[in the host country], but – in effect – this transplant exploits the re-
sources of the host country” (Casal, 1998:247). In this process “colonists 
strip the conquered territories of their resources, and use them for their 
own development” (Casal, 1998:147). This is effected through control 
over “authoritarian regimes which supplant nationalist movements or 
alliances with elites concerned with their own short-term, class-interests 
rather than with their country’s long-term prospects of development” 
(Casal, 1998:147). Dominance over the host country of the kind 
described here places it in a position in the world market “from which it is 
very difficult to develop and successfully compete” (Casal, 1998:147). A 
pattern of “undesirable consequences” (Casal, 1998:144) is repeated in 
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the one-way direction of surplus value: from periphery to the metropolis 
(Casal, 1998:147), which translates to “from exploited class to exploiting 
class” (the latter including the native elites in the host countries). 
Internationalization binds various indigenous or domestic bourgeoisies in 
Third World countries to capital “they do not control” (Resch, 1992:353), 
creating an international division of labour and rendering terms like 
foreign and indigenous capital irrelevant. The bourgeoisie in the Third 
World do not achieve a degree of autonomy comparable to its 
counterpart in the First World, the main reason being that the Third World 
economic base cannot grow beyond the limits imposed by its position 
within the international division of labour (Resch, 1992:354). The 
predominance of multinational capital, removed from national identifica-
tions and constraints, pursues labour-exploitive policies with the as-
sistance of representative governments that sanction and legitimize the 
process. 
Mandaza (1999:82) sees Africa in its neo-colonial condition as an 
“extension of Europe”, without any significant autonomy. The emergent 
black “petit and compradorian bourgeoisie” (Mandaza, 1999:83) in the 
African nation states are the outcome of external factors integral to the 
transition from white to black rule and the “politics of reconciliation” 
between the former white rulers and the current black ones. Their post-
colonial state in Africa is thus a “hostage state” (Mandaza, 1999:83) 
caught between white settlers who have economic power (and thus wield 
political influence disproportionate to their numbers), and economic 
globalization driven by the former colonial powers. Within this context of 
“incomplete decolonization” (Mandaza, 1999:79), a difference-blind, libe-
ral paradigm, emphasizing human rights and democracy resists “funda-
mental transformation” (Mandaza, 1999:79) for instance, in Zimbabwe 
and South Africa. The politics of reconciliation explain “the failure to see 
through the agenda of the nationalist struggle ... [and its emphasis on] 
the ideology of reconciliation” (Mandaza, 1999:79). If we look at the 
agenda of the nationalist struggle, we see the class question. We see 
that reconciliation represents “the class fulfilment of those who make it 
immediately in the new dispensation” (Mandaza, 1999:81). Their 
immorality is reflected in their willingness to forgive their oppressors in 
exchange for state power “without the fulfilment of social justice for the 
majority” (Mandaza, 1999:81). Acceptance of state power without 
economic control merely reinforces “old relations of production as well as 
the unequal structures of ownership” (Mandaza, 1999:85), thus exposing 
black people to the structural coercion inherent in capitalism. 
Samir (1997:306) echoes this line of thought. Independence brought no 
change to the exploitive mode of integration of Africa into the world 
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capitalist system. Samir (1997:307-308) argues that the agricultural 
revolution in Africa has been derailed by the “super-exploitation of the 
African peasants’ labour” by the “local classes who act as ... [world 
capitalism’s] relay”. Interference by capital in the organization of pro-
duction compels farmers to specialize in crops capital requires, bought at 
prices which undersell the peasant’s labour power. Formal ownership of 
the land is thereby “emptied of its genuine content” (Samir, 1997:308). 
Worse still, the “green revolution” (Samir, 1997:310) strengthened 
capitalist control over the farmers by first integrating production in the 
“upstream” (Samir, 1997:311) monopolies, and then subjecting farming 
to industry – “downstream” (Samir, 1997:311) food processing mono-
polies. The effect of “agro-industrial integration” (Samir, 1997:311) was 
simply one of “transforming the benefit of peasant surplus labour to the 
monopolies” (Samir, 1997:311), and foreign capital that controls the 
monopolies. 
1.2.2  Secondary exploitation 
1.2.2.1  Exploitation and knowledge production in Africa 
In “The Second Bashorun M.K.O. Abiola Distinguished Lecture”, Houn-
tondji (1995) offers argument in support of the idea that scientific activity 
in Africa is just as “externally oriented” (Hountondji, 1995:2) as economic 
activity, serving Europe rather than Africa. The integration of traditional 
knowledge into the world system of knowledge has set Africa in a 
position of underdevelopment and backwardness in relation to Europe. 
We should, argues Hountondji (1995:3), view underdevelopment as an 
effect of domination and exploitation, in the context of a historical 
approach, entailing the integration of subsistence economies into world 
capital. And we should allow for a parallel in the field of scientific and 
technological endeavour, i. e. we should view weakness in the field of 
knowledge as the result of “peripherization” (Hountondji, 1995:3) due to a 
knowledge market controlled by the metropolitan worlds. If we grant this, 
the following indices of “scientific extroversion” (Hountondji, 1995:4) are 
apparent. 
• Because of the lack of specific theory-building procedures and 
infrastructures, which are needed to interpret raw information and 
process raw data, Africa has inherited from the metropolitan worlds 
only centres for applied research, and these are concerned only with 
the gathering and exportation of knowledge and information useful to 
Europe. The result? In the field of knowledge, a dependency on 
Europe has developed. Centres for applied research became “im-
mense data banks, storehouses of bare facts and information 
reserved for exportation to the ruling country” (Hountondji, 1995:2-3). 
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• Scholars in Africa have done a kind of “mental extroversion” 
(Hountondji, 1995:4), choosing research programmes answering only 
to the expectations of the metropolitan worlds. So the theoretical work 
done in Africa has become bound to “a kind of insularity” (Hountondji, 
1995:4) in the sense that the research done by Africans in Africa do 
not answer to the needs and concerns of Africans. The result? African 
scholars do no “basic research” (Hountondji, 1995:4), and scientific 
projects in Africa are utilized in the service of “economic extroversion” 
(Hountondji, 1995:4).  
• The kind of relationship that developed between modern science and 
ethno-science is one in which the latter is “eaten by the former” 
(Hountondji, 1995:4).  
• Scientific researchers in Africa now engage only in “vertical exchange” 
(Hountondji, 1995:9) with researchers in Europe and do not engage in 
“horizontal exchange” (Hountondji, 1995:9) with fellow researchers in 
Africa. 
1.2.2.2  Exploitation in Hountondji’s “culturalism” 
“Culturalism” (Hountondji, 1996:160) is the term Hountondji employs to 
denote a peculiar form of neo-colonialism, driven by complicity between 
African nationalists and Western ethnologists, and emphasizing the 
cultural aspect of foreign domination at the expense of other aspects, the 
economic and political in particular. Culturalism is in fact an ideological 
system because “it produces an indirect political effect. It eclipses, first, 
the problem of effective national liberation and, second, the problem of 
class struggle” (Hountondji, 1996:162). This “indirect political effect” is 
achieved in two ways. In the guise of cultural nationalism, culturalism 
drastically simplifies the national culture, “schematizes and flattens it in 
order to contrast it with the colonizer’s culture, and then gives this 
imaginary opposition precedence over real political and economic 
conflicts” (Hountondji, 1996:162). In the independent African countries 
culturalism takes the form of a backward-looking cultural nationalism, 
“flattening the national culture and denying its internal pluralism and 
historical depth”(Hountondji, 1996:162), in order to divert the attention of 
the exploited classes from the real political and economic conflicts which 
divide them from the ruling classes under the fallacious pretext of their 
common participation in “‘the’ national culture” (Hountondji, 1996:162). 
The cultural nationalism of independent African countries are presented, 
falsely, as “deceptive singular”, closed, homogeneous and monolithic – 
“flat ... strongly simple and univocal”, “petrified in a synchronic picture”, 
which strips it of “the fruitful tensions by which is it animated” (Houn-
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tondji, 1996:160), and which neglects its most significant characteristic, 
its status as “the unfinished history of a ... contradictory debate” (Houn-
tondji, 1996:161). Thus schematized African cultures are exploited, in 
essentialist comparisons with European cultures which reveal that “the 
moment of colonization” (Hountondji, 1996:161) was the only important 
division in the history of the continent. The net effect of culturalism has 
been a retreat by the cultural nationalists to a false pluralism, an escape 
from the “psychological and political rape perpetrated upon them by 
Western imperialism” (Hountondji, 1996:164) into imaginary cultural 
origins, the so-called traditional (pre-colonial) political organization of pre-
colonial African society. This is a retreat into a state of psychological 
arrest, perpetuated by the myth that non-Western societies are “simple” 
at the level of ideology and belief, as well as into false sociology: 
“pluralism does not come to any society from outside but is inherent  in 
every society” (Hountondji, 1996:165). This retreat blinds Africa to the 
fact that the “decisive encounter” is not between Africa and Europe, but 
between “Africa and itself” (Hountondji, 1996:165). False pluralism has 
bequeathed a legacy amounting to an artificial choice between “cultural 
‘alienation’” (which is supposedly connected with political betrayal) and 
“cultural nationalism” (the obverse of political nationalism and often a 
pathetic substitute for it) (Hountondji, 1996:166). True political national-
ism requires important conditions: “African culture must return to itself, to 
its internal pluralism and to its essential openness” (Hountondji, 1996: 
166). But this homecoming has to be fought for on political grounds, on 
grounds of class pluralism – the tension between an exploiting and an 
exploited class – a class struggle which “knows no frontiers” and takes 
precedence over the conflicts between nations or ethnic groups 
(Hountondji, 1996:167). 
The later Nkrumah – of the 1970 edition of Consciencism – says 
Hountondji, correctly identified the class struggle in Africa as the central 
cause of its depressed economic and political condition, but fell victim to 
the fallacy of unanimism, the false ideology of cultural nationalism – the 
belief that cultural nationalism “aims at restoring the lost unity of African 
consciousness” (Hountondji, 1996:149). The 1970 edition, unlike the 
earlier one, boldly proclaimed “the universality of the class struggle 
(previously denied)” (Hountondji, 1996:146), manifesting as neo-colonial 
exploitation, a “class struggle on an international scale” (Hountondji, 
1996:135 citing Nkrumah). Nkrumah erred in thinking that this class 
struggle had been “introduced into Africa from the outside” (Hountondji, 
1996:137), that it is a feature only of contemporary African society and 
was not also a feature of the traditional structures (Hountondji, 1996:142-
143). “Culturalism” is the cause of the error. Nkrumah’s acceptance of 
the “classic ethnological ideology” (Hountondji, 1996:148), that pre-
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colonial Africa had a single ideology, led him to identify the pluralism of 
creeds, ideologies and cultural currents in the traditional, the Euro-
Christian and the Muslim regions of Africa as the cause of a crisis of 
identity (Hountondji, 1996:149), one to be remedied by a unifying 
ideology, a “philosophy of consciousness” (Hountondji, 1996:149) called 
“Consciencism”. Ideological falsity of this kind is the cause of the 
phenomenon of culturalism used so effectively to eclipse the problem of 
class struggle (Hountondji, 1996:162). In the Postscript to African 
Philosophy: myth and reality, Hountondji laments that Africa has “failed to 
develop ... [the Marxist] heritage” and notes that intellectuals are 
powerless to prevent it from being taken over shamelessly by completely 
“cynical and reactionary political groups ... for whom dialectics is a subtle 
way of justifying their own impatience and thirst of power” (Hountondji, 
1996:183). 
A second but no less serious error was Nkrumah’s blindness, introduced 
by his culturalism, to the intensity of the class struggle in Africa. Nkrumah 
acknowledged that colonization created an indigenous class “associated 
with social power and authority” (Hountondji, 1996:150, citing Nkrumah), 
but his focus was on its function as a “conveyor belt of European 
civilisation” (Hountondji, 1996:150) rather than its “exploitive role” 
(Hountondji, 1996:150) in economic and political affairs. The cultural 
conflict which preoccupied Nkrumah, however, was nothing less than a 
“sublimate form of a class struggle” (Hountondji, 1996:150). But even 
Nkrumah, argues Hountondji (1996:151), steeped in the fallacy of 
culturalism, cannot hide his awareness of the real issues – “[t]he real 
order (economical and political) can ... be detected behind his cultural 
discourse”. 
2. Exploitation – the moral paradigm 
Marxism, says Hountondji (1984: 113), was discovered at a particular 
point in the anti-colonial struggle, and served as a theoretical and 
ideological foundation for resistance precisely because it provided Africa 
with a better understanding of colonialism as a historical process. Even 
in Nkrumah “Marxism is but a theoretical tool, a means towards under-
standing and explanation” (Hountondji, 1984:114). Viewed in this way, 
Marxism served the black peoples, not the black peoples’ Marxism, and it 
served them by bringing them as “exploited classes to a clear awareness 
of this fact” (Hountondji, 1984:117).  
How did Marxism bring on an informed awareness of colonialism as a 
historical process?  
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My thesis is that later Marxist morality is relevant to our understanding of 
the exploitation phenomenon. As I judge there are two aspects to the 
moral implications of exploitation that need to be highlighted: the moral 
struggle for recognition, and the moral struggle for flourishing, which is 
the struggle to realize the conditions needed for a humanly human life to 
be possible. In the next section I touch on some points of later Marxist 
morality which aid me in demonstrating the thesis.  
2.1 Superseding the morality of the downtrodden 
Marx’s notion of “species-being” encapsulates the ideal person in whom 
personal and communal life merges into a “perfect unity” (Femia, 1999: 
42) described by Femia (1999:42) as the “internalized identity of each 
person with the social totality”. The human personality, dependent as it is 
“on the material conditions which determine their production” (Femia, 
1999:43, citing Marx), is wholly constituted by the “ensemble of social 
relationships” (Femia, 1999:44), by which is meant that agency is 
selfless, other-regarding, indifferent to sectional ties and private interests, 
and disposed to endorsing communal solidarity.  
According to Churchich (1994:34) the Marxist picture of a truly human 
morality is prefigured by the morality of the “toiling classes” (Churchich, 
1994:37), and will be the morality of the future classless society. This 
picture gives prominence to “collective morality” (Churchich, 1994:65), 
implicitly contains premisses that argue for “the primacy and supremacy 
of collectivism”, and treats the community “as the principal moral and 
social agency” (Churchich, 1994:165). Churchich identifies two themes in 
Marx’s collective morality. The first, called the “ethics of social structure” 
(Churchich, 1994:34) treats morality as grounded in socio-economic 
structures and as generated by “material causes” – “the economic 
relations in which men live and work” (Churchich, 1994:63). The content 
of morality is a function of “the totality of common interests and the sum 
total of social and economic relations” (Churchich, 1994: 35). The second 
is in Marx’s scheme a “second-best” morality, and consists of Marx’s 
critique of the “negatively individualistic” (Churchich, 1994:34) morality of 
the ruling class which subjects morality to class interests, treating it as 
“an object of commerce” (Churchich, 1994:36 citing Marx). Bourgeois 
morality has alienating consequences – “man feels outside himself” 
(Churchich, 1994:65, citing Marx) – a condition Marx believes will be 
overcome only once capital’s position as mediator between workers and 
their needs is challenged and overthrown. Then “the moral standard 
determined by the given stage of social evolution will become the 
‘individual’s very own standard’” (Churchich, 1994:138) and then the 
“ethics of social structure” can come into play. In Churchich’s (1994:138) 
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view, Marx’s charge of exploitation, understood as a moral concept, is 
rooted in this vision of human emancipation. 
Kamolnick (1998:345) underscores Churchich’s picture of an emanci-
pating morality. The “species-essence thesis” (Kamolnick, 1998:345), 
which is Marx’s vision of the social arrangements needed to effect a fit 
between person and community, states Marx’s “most fundamental and 
distinctly Marxian” (Kamolnick, 1998:346) reasons for rejecting bourgeois 
norms as incompatible with man’s special-essence, viz., “their utter 
dehumanizing consequences for and on humanly human life” 
(Kamolnick, 1998:146). Marx’s commitment to the overthrow of capitalist 
society cannot be grounded, argues Kamolnick (1998:347), on the basis 
of “a separation of private conscience from ... the ... normative, pre-
scriptive dimensions of a disalienated, humanly human life”. Collective 
morality is based on this disalienated condition of human life. And the 
overriding condition is the non-alienability of labour, understood as the 
intrinsic absolute value of human life, as opposed to alienated labour 
which is the “labour-power”-commodity generated by capitalist exploita-
tion. The “exclusively human” (Kamolnick, 1998:352) form of labour 
liberates in the sense that it enables the worker to realize “a purpose of 
his own that gives the law to his modus operandi” (Kamolnick, 1998:352 
citing Marx), and in realizing his own purpose he realizes “the true realm 
of freedom ... [which then] can blossom forth” (Kamolnick, 1998:352 
citing Marx).  
The “ethics of social structure” is an evolutionary stage superceding the 
stage of “second-best” morality. The transition is marked by the 
appearance of the phenomenon of disalienated labour. If all this is 
correct, we may say, with Bidet (1998:417) that the core of class morality 
is a universalizable viewpoint – the viewpoint “of those below, that of the 
exploited and dominated”. The possibility of offering this viewpoint as the 
core moral concept of class morality depends on making explicit 
assumptions about the appropriate conditions for a human being to 
tolerate. In so far as those conditions require for their realization the 
negation of alienated labour, they negate the force of the core moral 
concept of class morality. In its place Marx sets up a morality for a 
distinct “humanly human life” (Kamolnick, 1998:346), one in which two 
strains are dominant. The first focuses on “the concept of intrinsic human 
dignity or worth” (Churchich, 1994:139) actuated in a class-independent 
communist community; the second encapsulates the values of a certain 
kind of community, viz. communism. 
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2.2 The moral struggle for recognition and flourishing 
Assume, as I have suggested thus far, that neo-colonialism in Africa 
manifests as the condition of “second-best” morality. And assume further 
that Africa aspires to the “ethics of social structure” – the point of 
emancipation. Now, allow that the time frame between the “second-best” 
condition and the realization of the “ethics of social structure”, is the time 
needed for Africa to escape or end exploitation, and that the failure thus 
far to do so repeats the cycle of the synchronic interpretation of exploita-
tion. Since the truth of the diachronic interpretation depends on the truth 
of the synchronic interpretation, it follows that the diachronic inter-
pretation is also applicable to Africa in its neo-colonial situation, which is 
to say that under neo-colonialism Africa reproduces the conditions under 
which it remains entrapped in exploitation. What are the moral signifi-
cance of these interpretations? 
The synchronic and the diachronic claims invoke the idea of a 
universalizable moral viewpoint – the viewpoint of “those below”. Con-
sider that the universalizable viewpoint claims universality for the moral 
wrongness of exploitation. Under this viewpoint the relevant moral 
property of exploitive practices is the suffering of patients. If adopting the 
moral point of view is consistent with extending recognition to Africans as 
suffering patients, and if this description is also consistent with their self-
recognition, we can say that the mass African, in her class morality, 
judges herself – and is judged by others – in terms of the universalizable 
ethic encapsulated in the moral viewpoint of “those below”. The viewpoint 
of “those below” drives the moral struggle for emancipation, and this is 
the precursor struggle which serves the ends of the final struggle, the 
creation of the conditions needed for a humanly human life to flourish. 
Endorsing the viewpoint of “those below” as a moral truth fits the 
synchronic and the diachronic interpretations of exploitation. To simplify 
matters I shall refer to the two respective interpretations as claims which 
require moral responses. The diachronic claim is that the structure of 
capitalism compels the exploited to remain entrapped in exploitation. It 
depends for its truth on the truth of the synchronic claim – the claim that 
the exploited have no choice but to remain entrapped in a cycle of 
structural force. What are the essentials of the imputed moral 
awareness?  
First, Reiman (1997:183) treats the synchronic claim as sufficient, by 
itself, to support the Marxist charge that capitalism is a form of slavery. 
How severely the exploited are enslaved obviously depends on the truth 
of the diachronic claim. Reiman qualifies the implied compulsion by 
adding that “capitalist slavery is freer than classical slavery” and that 
“capitalist slavery is less awful than classical slavery”. Now, if the picture 
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of primary exploitation sketched by Casal (1998), Mandaza (1999), and 
Samir (1997) is correct, the exploited have no choice but to remain en-
slaved. The structural force of capital in its synchronic sense is simply 
too great. Yet the argument does not stop there. It is significant that 
being exploited, in line with the structural force of the synchronic claim, 
leaves the exploited with only so much choice “as is compatible with their 
deploying themselves among the fates before them in roughly the same 
way their forcer wants” (Reiman, 1997:183). So there is choice, but 
having so little means it is not irrational for the exploited to give it up 
(Reiman, 1997:183). They give it up because they are vulnerable in 
virtue of their position in the global picture which determines “a range of 
things they can do, with options outside this range ... prohibitively costly” 
(Reiman, 1997:162). 
Second, the structural force of the synchronic claim is fuelled by capital’s 
ideological dominance (the very dominance that ensures the truth of the 
diachronic claim). To see what is involved here consider again Houn-
tondji’s view that the domination of the African populace by the neo-
colonial African elite is necessary for the coercive extraction of surplus 
value and for the maintenance of their power, but that the extraction on 
which power depends is driven by the false ideology of “culturalism”. 
Ideology functions as “a socially structured symbolic system constituting 
or ‘interpellating’ human individuals as social subjects”, a function it per-
forms from “its social basis in specific institutions or ‘ideological 
apparatuses’” (Resch, 1992:159). Resch (1992:215) explains ideology as 
the way in which men and women are formed in order to participate in a 
“process of which they are not the makers”. The process is 
“interpellation”, the making of the subject. The individual is “always 
already subject” (Resch, 1992:210) in the sense that she is enmeshed in 
the practices of “ideological recognition” (Resch, 1992:210). The domi-
nant ideology, the ideology of the ruling class, inscribed in concrete 
social practicals and institutions, effectively guarantees that individuals 
are interpellated in such a way that they “will reproduce the existing 
relations of production” (Resch, 1992:211). The “material existence” of 
an ideological apparatus (Resch, 1992:213) is the maker of working 
class “experiences of exploitation” (Resch, 1992:226) as distinct from the 
“theory of the exploitation” (Resch, 1992:226 citing Althusser). As Resch 
makes Althusser’s point, “it is not by Marxism that the proletariat dis-
covers that it is exploited”; however, it is by “Marxism that it learns the 
mechanism and the modalities of its exploitation” (Resch, 1992:226).  
The existence of ideological hegemony of the kind under consideration, 
and its “mechanisms” and “modalities”, is the cause of the phenomenon 
of “culturalism” used so effectively to eclipse the problem of class 
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struggle (Hountondji, 1996:162). The eclipse, notes Hountondji (1996: 
164), brings on the false pluralism of  the neo-colonial elite, and an 
exploitable state of psychological arrest which blinds Africans to the fact 
that the decisive encounter is not between Africa and Europe, but 
between “Africa and itself” (Hountondji, 1996:165). The failure to see 
through the deception reinforces the “classic ethnological ideology” 
(Hountondji,1996:148) which Western ethnographers in alliance with the 
neo-colonial African elite have fostered onto Africa, thus bending Africa’s 
cultural life to the requirements of synchronic exploitation, causing 
“economic extroversion”, as much as “mental extroversion” (Hountondji, 
1996:4). It is this “extroversion” into which the African subject is 
“interpellated”, making self-recognition in terms other than that of the 
“classic ethnological ideology” difficult to escape. So economic enslave-
ment is completed by enslavement of the soul. Africans, says Hountondji 
(1983:47), have learnt “how dangerous it can be for one man to wait for 
another to provide him with a certificate of humanity”. And it is this lesson 
that must now not be unlearned. Africa should not measure itself against 
Europe in areas Europe has created historically. Africans are aware that 
in the fields of scientific and technological endeavour “historic Europe ... 
is today, and until further notice, almost unbeatable” (Hountondji, 
1985:47). Even in the social and human sciences there are no 
researchers of significance – “contemporary Africa could offer but very 
little, and even nothing” (Hountondji, 1985:47). Africa, however, does not 
“wish to catch up with anyone. But we want to walk always, night and 
day, in the company of man, of every man” (Hountondji, 1985:48, citing 
Fanon). 
Third, in the neo-colonial context Africa has a problem to salvage its 
ancient heritage. The success of ethnographers’ exploitation of ethno-
philosophy as tool of “mystification”, says Hountondji (1996:171), is “the 
secret of our defeat by the West” (Hountondji, 1996:172). Since it is no 
longer possible for the tradition of Ur-African philosophies to serve 
purposes of demystification, having lost its “critical charge, its truth” 
(Hountondji, 1996:171), to “the weight and concrete methods of ... 
oppressive and repressive [neo-colonial state] apparatuses” (Hountondji, 
1996:181), Africa must for the sake of its own real liberation “take up 
European science and technology” (Hountondji, 1996:172) which means 
putting to work “the European concept of philosophy that goes hand in 
hand with science and technology” (Hountondji, 1996:172). The prime 
task of philosophy in Africa is to “contribute to the development of 
science” (Hountondji, 1996:175). Hountondji (1996:97) approvingly cites 
Althusser: “[T]he great philosophical revolutions are always the sequel of 
great scientific revolutions, so that philosophy is originally linked, in its 
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growth and evolution, with the birth and development of the sciences” 
(Hountondji, 1996:97). 
Emancipation is, in Hountondji’s view, driven by the progress of science 
in Africa as much as by the need to organize society along lines that 
recognizes the tradition yet improves on it in ways capable of coping with 
the pressures of modernization. Yet in this endeavour reappropriating 
Africa’s own ancestral heritage becomes problematic. The risk of over-
valuing the cultural and technological products of Africa’s erstwhile 
masters endangers the possibility of achieving an appropriate balance 
between the conservation of a heritage and the adoption of an alien one. 
How much tradition will the progress of science erode? In the exploitive 
position Africa currently lies entrapped in, the balance is in favour of the 
rapid erosion of tradition. Breaking the fetters of exploitation presents a 
view of a possible world in which Africans gain greater control over the 
conservation of their traditions, on terms appropriate to Africa’s needs for 
modernization. Africans, thinks Hountondji (1995:9), must marry their 
desire to save their ancestral heritage with their desire to appropriate the 
international heritage, including the processes of scientific and technolo-
gical innovation. But the marriage, it seems, must be effected on terms 
acceptable to Africans, for otherwise how could the moral norm en-
capsulated in the idea of a humanly human life be grounded and take 
root? This spectre is, if Hountondji is right, the ideal that Marxist theory 
has enabled Africans to see and pursue.  
Fourth, the precursor struggle, the struggle for recognition, establishes 
the groundwork for a settling of accounts with Africa’s former masters. If 
we allow that the universalizable moral viewpoint of “those below” 
morally binds patient and agent, then the former colonial powers, now 
operating in Africa under a neo-colonial guise, have a moral re-
sponsibility to compensate Africa for centuries of exploitation. How might 
a justifying argument be mounted? The synchronic and diachronic claims 
suggest such arguments. The synchronic argument looks like this. 
• Africa has no choice about being entrapped in exploitation. 
• A condition of “no choice” is obtained because the synchronic force is 
too great. 
• Synchronic force places Africa in the service of Europe. 
• This, however, is unpaid service. 
• Therefore, to escape the injustice of  nonpayment, Africa must be 
compensated. 
The diachronic argument may be stated thus: 
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• Africa reproduces the conditions under which it renders unpaid 
service. 
• Ending those conditions is impossible (because the diachronic force is 
too great). 
• Therefore, to escape the injustice of nonpayment, Africa must be 
compensated. 
Compensation for a history of exploitation is a very complex undertaking. 
The African Reparations Movement (ARM)1 appeals to a variant of the 
diachronic argument. The voices of ARM, in Africa and the African 
Diaspora, are voices making moral claims taking as their point of 
departure the conditions needed for the realization of the ideal of a 
humanly human life for the exploited peoples of Africa. The variant 
argument runs like this: 
• Since the onset of colonialism, Africa has reproduced the conditions 
under which it renders unpaid service to Europe. 
• Ending those conditions is impossible (because of synchronic and 
diachronic force). 
• Over centuries Africa has accumulated much overdue payment. 
• Therefore, to escape the injustice of past and present nonpayment, 
Africa must be compensated for all unpaid service. 
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